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Due to a multitude of domestic and international political and economic forces, over the 
last three to four decades it became prudent for many national development agencies to 
develop something of an arms-length relationship towards their aid activity. The 
standard multilateral institutions had taken up some of this in the 1970s, and in the 
process changed the bonds between root donors and recipients, altering the roles and 
effectiveness of both bilateral and multilateral institutions. However, by the 1990s the 
standard multilateral institutions had their own reputation issues. Donor governments 
and multilateral institutions began to rely heavily on nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs) to allocate aid and to implement aid projects/programmes.1 Since NGOs 
usually have well-defined goals, donor government policy can be achieved by funding 
the NGOs which have similar mindsets. 
At the same time it became popular to discuss economic development in terms of 
developing the proper set of institutions—including the legal framework and social 
conventions. International aid was brought into this discussion in terms of its influence 
on institutional development and its impact on growth and other indicators of 
development. While not universally embraced, a stylized fact of development policy 
became that good governance is a necessary prerequisite in order for aid to be effective 
in terms of raising a nation’s rate of growth.2 
Together the movement by root donors towards more arms-length relationships with the 
aid process and the new light shown on the role of governance in implementing proper 
policies have had a large impact on both the discussion and implementation of 
development policy. If good governance is necessary for the effective use of aid, then 
by allocating aid on the basis of a country achieving good governance is a ‘win-win’ 
situation: aid is given to where it will have an impact and objective criteria can be 
established. This will minimize the necessity for detailed bureaucratic planning, 
disbursement and oversight, as aid is in part the reward for good governance, and with 
good governance it is assumed aid will be channelled properly. The introduction of the 
Millennium Challenge Account into the US debate and the establishment of the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation arose in this environment.3 
This is a very powerful argument for decentralization: give aid to only those with good 
governance. You reduce the need for many levels of checks and you allow the aid 
allocation decision to be made by those closest to the needs. We analyse this 
decentralization of decisionmaking in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. We model 
                                                 
1  During the 1990s, the number and role of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) taking 
part in the foreign aid process grew. For all the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, 
official development assistance (ODA) to NGOs increased from US$928 million in 1991-92 to 
US$1,246 million in 2002, an increase of 34 per cent. This represents an increase from 1.59 to 2.14 
per cent of all DAC ODA from 1991-92 to 2002. For the United Kingdom, a country where this shift 
is quite stark, the funding of ODA to NGOs went from US$21 to US$226 million, an increase of 
976.2 per cent, and from 0.65 per cent of all UK ODA in 1990-91 to 4.6 per cent in 2002. The number 
of international NGOs grew by 19.3 per cent during the decade. See Epstein and Gang (2005) for an 
analysis of the role of NGOs in the aid process. 
2 See  McGillivray  et al. (2005) for a review and analysis of the empirical work surrounding this change. 
Also see Heckelman and Knack (2005) for an argument that aid retards economic liberalization. 
3   See Mavrotas and Villanger (2006) for an alternative characterization of this process.  
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the aid allocation decision where the donor government has announced that good 
governance is the criterion for receiving aid. Potential recipients must compete for the 
aid funds. The structure of the competition, we shall see, is important to the donor in 
terms of achieving good governance, and to the recipients in terms of what they receive. 
Potential recipients view aid as part of their overall programme. The governments, 
represented by their leaders, are after all the presumed beneficiaries of bad governance. 
Those implementing policy (the government or the leader) are explicit rent-seekers who 
consider aid as part of the total ‘package’ available to them. 
In section 2, which constitutes the bulk of the paper, we present our model and our 
major results. Section 3 examines the possibility of a poverty trap. Section 4 takes up 
another implementation of the model, the role of NGOs. Section 5 concludes. 
2 The  model 
Consider the case where there exist m countries, each wanting to obtain aid from the 
same donor. We assume that aid, A, is not determined endogenously; the donor has a 
fixed level of funds, A, to give as aid. The US Congress, for example, could determine 
the optimal amount to donate with regard to other budgetary items. After determining 
the optimal amount of total aid, donors then decide how it should be divided among 
potential recipients. An aid agency might first decide what the regional allocations 
should be, and then how much each country within a region receives. 
Each country has a leader who benefits from receiving aid. Note that the marginal 
benefit each leader receives may vary over countries as each leader/country may have 
different objectives or abilities in obtaining utility from the aid it receives. In order to 
simplify our model, we assume that each leader benefits differentially from aid 
received, and the marginal benefit from each aid dollar is constant in each country but 
differs among countries. Denote by ni the marginal benefit a leader of country i can 
receive from a dollar of aid. It is not clear which of the leaders have more to gain. 
Namely, if ni is greater or smaller than nj for all i j ≠ . One can think of winning aid in 
probabilistic terms. The probability that leader/country i wins the contest and receives 
aid is equal to Pri . The expected benefit a country/leader i receives in this competition 
equals  Pri A ni.  One can also look at Pri as the proportion of total aid that this 
leader/country receives. To simplify, we generally talk about proportions of total aid 
obtained and not probabilities of winning aid, keeping in mind that the two are 
equivalent.4 
In order to receive aid, the donor decides that potential recipient countries must invest in 
quality governance. The more one invests, the higher is the chance of receiving aid. 
This is aid’s effectiveness—its ability to draw funds that would have been spent 
elsewhere to targeted objectives. In some sense this is the opposite of how we usually 
think of aid being fungible, when we discuss the leakage of aid from targeted objectives. 
Here we can think of fungible domestic funds and revenue helping the country’s leader 
                                                 
4  Although mathematically equivalent, they are conceptually distinct. In the two scenarios we present 
below, one naturally lends itself to a discussion in terms of the probability of winning aid, while the 
intuition for the other is better when thinking about the proportion of aid obtained. Proportions and 
probabilities are isomorphic only under risk neutrality, which is assumed.  
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raise the quality of governance. Since the total amount of aid available is fixed, the 
greater the ability of the leader to shift expenditures, the greater the opportunity for 
quality governance. Obviously, good governance is only one of many goals that donors 
may define, but we keep with the recent literature in presuming that the donor chooses 
governance as the goal on the assumption that this ensures proper spending of aid funds. 
Good governance itself is a rather amorphous goal, difficult to measure and consisting 
of many dimensions.  
We denote by xi the amount of effort and investment in quality governance by a 
leader/country i. Effort, xi, can be seen as the number or quality of changes in a country 
(xi can be a measurable index of change). The investments made by all 
leaders/countries, xi, determine the proportion of the aid obtained (or the probability of 
winning the contest).5 
We assume that investment in quality governance is costly to the leader. Investment in 
quality governance decreases the power of the leader; for example, the leader will have 
less control and as a result obtain fewer and smaller bribes. Therefore, the leader sees 
investment in quality governance as a reduction in his utility. However, investment in 
quality governance is part of a contest among countries to obtain aid. While the utility 
of the leader declines as more investment in good governance takes place, the potential 
for receiving aid funds raises the leader’s expected utility. 
We consider two cases:  
i)  All of the aid goes to one country only. Here we assume that the donor country 
gives aid to the country that invests the most effort in quality governance; and 
ii)  Aid is divided proportionally according to the investment in quality 
governance made by each of the leaders of the different countries. 
To simplify we assume that quality governance has a fixed marginal cost of unity for 
each unit of quality governance invested by the leader. Thus, the expected net payoff 
(surplus) for the risk-neutral leader of a country is:  
() m i x n A w E i i i i ,..., 2 , 1 Pr = ∀ − = . (1) 
For now we assume that the proportion of aid obtained in the contest (or the probability 
of winning the contest) satisfies the following conditions:  
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ii)  As leader/country i increases its effort in quality governance, it obtains a 









                                                 
5  Just because one invests in good governance does not mean that it is achieved. Moreover, some 
countries may obtain good governance with smaller investments than other countries. Noting these 
two caveats, we assume that investment in good governance is synonymous with achieving good 
governance.  
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iii)  As leader of country j, the opponent of the leader of country i, increases efforts 









.  Finally, 
iv)  The marginal increase in the proportion of aid obtained from the contest 










 (this inequality 
ensures that the second-order conditions for maximization are satisfied).6  
The leaders of the countries engage in a contest over quality governance in order to 
obtain aid from the donor country. We assume a Nash equilibrium outcome. Each 
country determines the level of its quality governance xi so that its expected payoff, 




























Thus, given that the proportion has decreasing marginal utility with respect to the level 
of quality governance, we obtain that the country with the higher marginal benefit from 
a dollar of aid will invest more effort in quality governance. For example, if the leader 
of country 1 has the higher marginal benefit from a dollar of aid compared to the leader 
of country 2,  2 1 n n > , then country 1 will determine its effort in quality governance, x1, 










∂ in order to increase its proportion 
of the aid received. The leader that has a higher marginal benefit from winning the 
contest will invest the highest amount of effort in quality governance. 
To simplify and without loss of generality assume that:  
m n n n n ≥ ≥ > ≥ ... 3 2 1  (4) 
This assumption simply states that there are leaders from at least two countries who 
have higher marginal benefit compared to leaders of all other countries.  
2.1  Aid given to one country only 
We now describe the situation where the donor gives all the aid to only one country. We 
assume the extreme situation in which all the aid goes to the country that has undertaken 
                                                 
6   The function Pri(.) is usually referred to as a contest success function (CSF). The functional forms of 
the CSF’s commonly assumed in the literature satisfy these assumptions (see Nitzan 1994).   
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the greatest investment in quality governance. In other words, the leader that invests in 
the highest level of quality governance will receive the donor’s entire aid allocation, A. 
The contest success function in this case is the all-pay auction where the country that 
invests the highest amount in quality governance wins all the aid; however, those that 
do not win, cannot revert to lower quality governance. While some part of the quality 
governance is reversible, not all of it is reversible. To simplify we assume that none of 
the investment in quality governance is reversible.  
The contest success function (CSF), the probability of winning the aid, under the all-pay 
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Pr  (5) 
It can be verified that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium as well as a 
continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria. In any equilibrium, countries 3 through m 
invest zero effort in quality governance activities with probability one (see Baye, 
Kovenock and de Vries 1993), so that only the two countries whose leaders have the 
highest marginal benefit from aid will participate. 
Result 1: In the contest under which aid goes to one country only, just the two 
countries that have the highest marginal benefit from the aid will invest in 
quality governance. 
This contest is, therefore, good only if we have a small number of countries competing 
for aid. Otherwise we obtain that from the m countries, only two participate in the 
contest and thus only two will invest effort in quality governance.  
We conduct our analysis further for two leaders of two countries, leader 1 and leader 2. 
Without loss of generality, assume that the marginal benefit of leader 1 from aid is 
greater than that of the leader of country 2,  2 1 n n > . It is clear, therefore, that leader 1 is 
able to make larger investments in quality governance than leader 2. However, it is not 
clear how much each leader will invest in equilibrium. We can thus view the 
investments in quality governance as bids by the leaders. It is a standard result that  
there are no pure strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions (Hillman and Riley 1989; 
Ellingsen 1991; and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1993). It is also a standard result that 
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in all-pay auctions. Suppose leader 2   
bids 0 < x2  ≤  n2. Then the first leader’s optimal response is x1 = x2 + ε  <  An1  
(i.e., marginally higher than x2). But then x2 > 0 cannot be an optimal response   
to x1 = x2 + ε. Also, it is obvious that x1 = x2 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, there 
is no equilibrium in pure strategies. There is a unique equilibrium in mixed   
strategies given by the following cumulative distribution functions (see Hillman and 
Riley 1989; Ellingsen 1991, and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1993), 
                                                 
7  Under this scenario, thinking in terms of the probability of winning the contest enhances our intuition.  
6 
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show that leader 1 bids uniformly on [0, n2], while leader 2 puts a probability mass 
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= = ∫ . Note that in the all-pay 
auction we can think of the designation ‘leader’ as probabilistic—i.e., the stronger 
player is more likely to win the contest. 
Based on these studies, we can obtain equilibrium expected investment in quality 
governance, equilibrium probabilities and expected payoffs. In the case of only two 
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The expected equilibrium payoff for each country equals:  




1 = − = w E and n n A w E . (9) 
In equilibrium, the total amount of quality governance carried out by both countries 
(assuming one can add the components) equals: 
















= + = . (10) 
Identical marginal benefits from aid 
Let us consider the case in which both leaders have the same marginal benefit from a 
dollar of aid: 
n1 = n 2= n   (11) 









A x E = =    (12) 
The probability of winning aid by each of the countries equals one-half, the expected 
payoff for each leader is zero and the total invested in quality governance by both 











1 = = w E w E and  n A X =
* . (13) 
2.2 Aid proportionate to the governance quality of each country 
Here we consider the case where the leaders of the countries compete with one another 
in a contest in which no one wins all the aid. In the general case, there are m countries 
competing against one another. Later in this paper we compare our two case scenarios 
with each other: only one country gains the entire aid with the case where each receives 
a proportion of the aid. In the scenario where only one country gets all the aid, as 
indicated above, only the leaders of the two countries with the highest marginal benefit 
from a dollar of aid will compete. In the case we discuss below, the number of 
competing countries has a strong effect on the expected payoffs and on the total amount 
of resources invested in activities to increase governance quality. It can be shown that as 
the number of countries increases, both the expected amount of resources invested in 
quality governance and expected payoffs of the leaders of the countries may increase or 
decrease. This will depend on the relative levels of the marginal benefit of aid of 
competing leaders of the countries (Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1993; Che and 
Gale 1998; Epstein and Nitzan 2005a, 2005b). As a result of this, and as we wish to 
compare our results in this type of situation to the one presented above, we restrict our 
analysis to two leaders competing for aid. 
Each country under this contest for aid will receive a proportional amount of funds 
relative to the amount invested in quality governance. We assume that the contest is 









= Pr .   (14) 
This function states that each country receives aid proportional to its investment in 
quality governance relative to the investment made in quality governance by the 
competing country.  
The expected net payoff (surplus) for the risk-neutral leader of country i is thus given by 
() 2 , 1 , , Pr = ≠ ∀ −
+
= − = j i j i x n A
x x
x
x n A w E i i
j i
i
i i i i . (15) 
The first-order condition, as stated in Equation (2) that ensures that the leaders of the 
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. (16) 
Denote by  j i j i xi ≠ = ∀ 2 , 1 ,
*  the Nash equilibrium outcome of the contest. Solving 
(16) for both leaders using a Nash equilibrium, we obtain that the level of quality 
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Therefore, in a Nash equilibrium, the proportion of aid obtained by each of the countries 
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= .   (19) 
And finally, assuming we can add up the amounts of effort invested in quality 
governance of the countries, we can calculate the total amount of effort invested 
together by both countries in quality governance. In the literature this measure is called 
rent dissipation. In our contest it tells us how much effort the leaders in the countries 
have invested in quality governance in order to increase the proportion of aid obtained 
from the donor country. 
We denote this total effort invested in quality governance in equilibrium by 
* X : 
j i
j i n n




2 1 * * *  .  (20) 
Identical marginal benefits from aid 
In the case in which the leaders of the countries are symmetric in terms of their marginal 
benefit from aid, i.e., n1=n2=n (as in (11)), we obtain that the level of investment in 








1 = = .   (21) 
                                                 
8   Under this scenario, our intuition is enhanced by thinking in terms of the proportion of the rents 
obtained from the contest.  
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The Nash equilibrium proportion of the aid obtained by each of the countries will be 







1 = = . (22) 
The expected equilibrium payoff to each leader equals: 
() () A
n





1 = = ,   (23) 
and finally the total effort invested in quality governance in equilibrium equals: 
A n X
2
* = . (24) 
2.3  Comparing proportional aid and aid to one country 
We now wish to compare these two types of contests both from the perspective of the 
donor and the leaders of the recipient countries. The donor is concerned with the level 
(the quantity and intensity) of the quality of governance in potential recipient countries. 
It wishes to find a contest that will maximize the amount of quality governance for a 
given level of aid. The receiving leaders wish to have a contest that will maximize their 
expected net payoffs. Let us therefore compare both systems and see which is better 
from the perspective of the donor and of the leaders of the receiving countries.  
Identical marginal benefit from aid  
Let us first compare the two situations in the scenario where both leaders have the same 
marginal benefit from aid, n1 = n 2= n. 



















1 = = w E w E and  n A X =
* .   (25) 
Under a contest in which each obtains a proportional amount of aid relative to their 





















1 = = , 
2
* n A X = .   (26) 
It is clear, therefore, that in both cases the probability/proportion of aid received by each 
country is identical to fifty per cent. Each country in the case in which all the aid goes to 
one country invests more resources in quality governance while each of the leaders of 
the countries has a higher expected payoff under the relative system under which each 
country receives aid proportionate to their investment effort in quality governance. The 
more one invests, the higher the chance of receiving aid. The more fungible that non-aid 
funds are, the easier it is for the leader of a country to turn the governance system  
10 
around and embark on a path towards higher quality. Therefore, requiring that a country 
has better quality governance helps channel resources appropriately. Since the total 
amount of aid is fixed, the situation that maximizes the quality of governance increases 
the flexibility of non-aid funds. It is important to notice that even if only one country 
receives aid, both countries are investing in quality governance so the return to aid is 
from the two countries competing for the funds. 
Since the donor wishes to maximize quality governance and the leaders of the countries 
wish to maximize expected payoffs we obtain,  
Result 2:  In the case of an identical marginal benefit from each dollar of aid for the 
leaders of the country, the donor country will prefer the system under which 
the aid will all go to only one country, while the leaders of the receiving 
countries will prefer that each country obtain the proportion of aid relative to 
its governance quality. 
Marginal benefit from aid is not identical  
Now let us consider the case in which the marginal benefits of the leaders from aid are 
not identical and that leader 1 has a higher marginal benefit than leader 2,  2 1 n n > .  
In the case where all the aid goes to one country, for the country that invests in the 
highest level of quality governance, we obtain from (7)-(10) that expected investment in 
quality governance, the probability of winning the aid, the expected net payoff of the 
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On the other hand under the contest where each country receives aid in proportion to its 
investment in quality governance, we obtain from (17)-(20) that the investment in 
quality governance, the probability of winning the aid, the expected net payoff of the 
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3 The  Donor   
Let us start by analysing the relationship between the two contests from the donor’s 
perspective. In order to receive aid, the donor decides that the receiving countries must 
invest in quality governance.  
The total amount of expenditure on quality governance invested in the contest is higher 
under the relative generalized division of aid rather than the case that the aid goes all to 















Equation (29) holds if and only if:  
0 2 2 2 1
2
1 > − − n n n n . (30) 
From (30) we may conclude that the total amount invested in quality governance is 
higher under the relative system than with the system in which only one country 
receives the aid if  
( ) 2 1 2 1 + > n n . (31) 
Since, by assumption,  2 1 n n ≥ , the result indicates that in order for the relative system to 
be better for the donor country, the marginal benefit of a dollar of aid to the leader of 
country 1 has to be sufficiently larger than that of the other leader (more specifically it 
has to be more than twice as large). We summarize this result in the following 
proposition, 
Result 3:  If the variance between the marginal benefit to the leaders of the countries is 




n , then the donor country will prefer the 
relative system under which the countries obtain aid relative to their 
investment in quality governance instead of the system in which all the aid 
goes to the country that invested the most in quality governance.  
3.1  The leaders of the countries 
In order to analyse the preferences of the leaders of the countries who wish to obtain the 
aid, we must compare their expected payoffs under both systems. Remember that we 
assumed, without loss of generality, that leader 1 has at least as large a stake as leader 2 
() 2 1 n n ≥ . The leaders of the countries prefer the aid system that generates for them the 
maximum expected equilibrium payoff,  ()
*
i w E . Under the relative aid system, the 
expected equilibrium net payoff for leader 2 (the leader with the lower marginal benefit 














A w E while the expected equilibrium under the  
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system that aid goes to one country only equals zero, ()0
*
2 = w E . Therefore it is clear 
that:  
Result 4: The leader with the lower marginal benefit from aid will always prefer the 
proportional system under which each country receives aid proportional 
relative to the amount invested in quality governance.  
For the leader with the higher marginal benefit from aid, the expected equilibrium net 














A w E while the expected 
equilibrium net payoff under the system of the single-country recipient equals 
() ( ) 2 1
*
1 n n A w E − = . The expected payoff for leader 1 under the relative system is 

















Equation (32) holds if and only if 
0 2 2 2 1
2
1 < − − n n n n . (33) 
From Equation (33) we may conclude that the relative system is better for the leader 
with the higher marginal benefit if: 
( ) 2 1 0 2 1 + < < n n . (34) 
In other words, 
Result 5: The leader with the higher marginal benefit prefers the relative system if the 





n .   
The donor and the leader of the country with the higher marginal benefit from aid have 
conflicting preferences. However, the donor and the leader with the lower marginal 
benefit from aid have similar preferences with regard to the type of contest to hold.  
3 Poverty  trap 
Now assume that the criteria for obtaining aid is not only how much the country invests 
in quality governance but also the level of its poverty. Let di be a parameter capturing 
how badly off the country is in terms poverty. We can think of di as the number of poor 
or a more formal measure of poverty, where an increasing di indicates greater poverty. 
In order to compare our results to the ones presented above, we restrict this analysis to 
the decentralized division of aid under which countries obtain aid in proportion to the  
13 
level of investment in governance quality (as well as the poverty level). We do not 
analyse this in the system where aid goes all to one country, as then we have to 
determine the criteria under which the ‘best’ wins. This will give us many different 
possibilities and we would get different results for each. Thus in order for us to be able 
to compare the results obtained earlier, we confine ourselves to the decentralized 
method under which each receives a proportion of the aid. Moreover, in order to add 
emphasis to our results, we consider the scenario where both countries have the same 
marginal benefit from aid, n1 = n2 = n. Again, the reason here is one of convenience and 
simplicity in comparing the results. 
Let the contest success function, the proportion of aid received by country i, be equal to, 
i j for






= Pr . (35) 
Under this contest for aid, each country will receive funds proportional to the 
investment in quality governance and the level of poverty. The donor allocates aid on 
the basis of the level of poverty (more poverty, more aid), making the probability of 
receiving aid increase with greater poverty. This contest success function is a variant of 
the Tullock (1980) contest success function (see also Epstein 2000). 
Each leader of each country invests in governance quality, xi, and decides whether to 
invest in poverty reduction (lowering di) or not (allowing poverty either to stay the same 
or increase). The expected net payoff of the leader of country i is given by:  
() 2 , 1 , , = ≠ ∀ − −
+
= j i j i d x n A
x j d x i d
x i d
w E j i
j i
i
i . (36) 
Solving the first-order conditions for both players, we obtain that the optimal 












d d x x = = = = , (37) 









* = = = and
n
X . (38) 
As we can see from this example, the results in terms of the donor country are identical 
to those we obtain when there is no option to increase the proportion of aid received 
based on the poverty level (see (21)-(23)). In both cases the leaders of the countries 
invest the same amount of resources. Thus in the two cases, both leaders will receive the 
same proportion of aid, invest the same amount of resources in quality governance and 
at the same time spend effort and resources in a way that poverty increases (of course, 
one measure of good governance could be poverty reduction). In other words, such a 
policy driven by the donor country will increase poverty.   
14 
Result 6:  If the donor introduces a condition under which the portion of aid received by 
a country is a function of the poverty of a country, then this will induce the 
country to make investments that will increase poverty while at the same time 
increase resources invested in governance quality. Such a system will create 
a poverty trap, causing the leaders of the countries to invest in order to raise 
the poverty level to obtain a higher proportion of aid.  
4  NGOs verses donor countries 
Now assume that countries that have a small amount of resources to donate will choose 
to do so directly to one country. On the other hand, NGOs may have more funds and, 
with returns to scale, be more able to give their resources to many countries, assuming 
that the donor and the NGO have the same goals. We may thus conclude: 
Result 7: In the case of m>2 countries competing for donor resources, the donor will 
take part of the resources and let two of the countries compete for it in the 
way that the one with the highest quality of governance receives all the 
funding. It will give the rest of the funding to NGOS who will divide the aid 
proportionate to the amount of resources invested by each of the countries. 
5 Conclusion 
The donor may have a particular goal related to its aid programme, or it may be trying 
to satisfy multiple objectives. To achieve these goals, the donor may need to encourage 
change in recipient behaviour. Recipients, however, are not passive. They have 
objectives of their own; in particular, their leaders may have their own agendas. To 
simplify the discussion in this paper, we assume the donor government believes that its 
multiple goals can be achieved by first ensuring there is good governance in the 
recipient country—and by withholding aid until that time. What drives our model is the 
donors’ desire for good governance and the local leaders’ desire for long-term gain. Our 
main result is that the recipient who is most effective in governance and stands to 
benefit the most, has interests opposite that of the donor. We also single out the desire 
of the donor for poverty reduction, the consequence of which may be the development 
of a poverty trap. In order to continue to receive transfers based on poverty, a potential 
recipient government may deliberately allocate funds away from the poorest so as not to 
better their position. Incentives often work in non-obvious ways. 
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